Coin info
Rank
Market Cap
Volume (24h)
Circulating Supply
Total Supply
Do you think the price will rise or fall?
Rise 40%
Fall 60%
Price perfomance
Depth of Market
Depth +2%
Depth -2%


PRICE
+17.24%
$0.2430
PRICE
+9.06%
$0.03448

PRICE
+8.42%
$396.79

PRICE
+6.96%
$0.1283

PRICE
+5.4%
$0.4851
PRICE
+5.16%
$672.96

PRICE
+5.16%
$66.29

PRICE
+5.11%
$0.2558

PRICE
+4.92%
$2.01

PRICE
+4.15%
$0.09759

PRICE
+4.14%
$0.03751

PRICE
+4%
$0.1844

PRICE
+3.46%
$0.007995

PRICE
+3.4%
$0.006397

PRICE
+3.07%
$0.09134

PRICE
+2.9%
$0.6895

PRICE
+2.75%
$0.9900

PRICE
+2.32%
$0.001750

PRICE
+2%
$0.8387

PRICE
+1.75%
$0.07978

PRICE
+1.41%
$1.35

PRICE
+1.35%
$0.055

PRICE
+1.3%
$0.1008

PRICE
+1.3%
$0.9400

PRICE
+1.23%
$52.55

VOL24
+488.35%
$1.14
VOL24
+364.93%
$0.01052

VOL24
+136.64%
$0.006401

VOL24
+96.79%
$1.13

VOL24
+79.83%
$397.06
VOL24
+70.79%
$672.82

VOL24
+69.1%
$0.9986

VOL24
+57.29%
$0.1282

VOL24
+50.76%
$0.6893

VOL24
+49.77%
$0.09757

VOL24
+49%
$0.9985

VOL24
+48.24%
$0.007996

VOL24
+43.67%
$2.01

VOL24
+42.68%
$0.2560

VOL24
+42.04%
$1.99

VOL24
+39.98%
$0.9991

VOL24
+38.16%
$0.9999

VOL24
+36.3%
$0.1547

VOL24
+36.21%
$0.8392

VOL24
+33.36%
$9.13

VOL24
+31.85%
$251.94

VOL24
+29.24%
$0.3456

VOL24
+29.21%
$66.35

VOL24
+28.19%
$0.2346

VOL24
+27.57%
$0.4849

PRICE
+17.24%
$0.2430
PRICE
+9.06%
$0.03448

PRICE
+8.42%
$396.79

PRICE
+6.96%
$0.1283

PRICE
+5.4%
$0.4851
PRICE
+5.16%
$672.96

PRICE
+5.16%
$66.29

PRICE
+5.11%
$0.2558

PRICE
+4.92%
$2.01

PRICE
+4.15%
$0.09759

PRICE
+4.14%
$0.03751

PRICE
+4%
$0.1844

PRICE
+3.46%
$0.007995

PRICE
+3.4%
$0.006397

PRICE
+3.07%
$0.09134

PRICE
+2.9%
$0.6895

PRICE
+2.75%
$0.9900

PRICE
+2.32%
$0.001750

PRICE
+2%
$0.8387

PRICE
+1.75%
$0.07978

PRICE
+1.41%
$1.35

PRICE
+1.35%
$0.055

PRICE
+1.3%
$0.1008

PRICE
+1.3%
$0.9400

PRICE
+1.23%
$52.55

VOL24
+488.35%
$1.14
VOL24
+364.93%
$0.01052

VOL24
+136.64%
$0.006401

VOL24
+96.79%
$1.13

VOL24
+79.83%
$397.06
VOL24
+70.79%
$672.82

VOL24
+69.1%
$0.9986

VOL24
+57.29%
$0.1282

VOL24
+50.76%
$0.6893

VOL24
+49.77%
$0.09757

VOL24
+49%
$0.9985

VOL24
+48.24%
$0.007996

VOL24
+43.67%
$2.01

VOL24
+42.68%
$0.2560

VOL24
+42.04%
$1.99

VOL24
+39.98%
$0.9991

VOL24
+38.16%
$0.9999

VOL24
+36.3%
$0.1547

VOL24
+36.21%
$0.8392

VOL24
+33.36%
$9.13

VOL24
+31.85%
$251.94

VOL24
+29.24%
$0.3456

VOL24
+29.21%
$66.35

VOL24
+28.19%
$0.2346

VOL24
+27.57%
$0.4849
Rise 40%
Fall 60%


$0.4561
#540
$40,448,601
$14,997,178
92,108,464.97
128,040,075.38
UMA is a decentralized financial contracts platform built to enable Universal Market Access. UMA builds infrastructure for “priceless” financial contracts: DeFi contracts that minimize oracle usage, avoiding many of the security and scalability issues that have plagued decentralized finance. The first contracts built with UMA are priceless synthetic tokens: ERC20 tokens that can track anything while minimizing the need for on-chain price data. The UMA project token powers the system in two ways: Governance: UMA token holders govern what types of contracts can access the system, which asset types are supported, and key system parameters and upgrades. Price requests: the priceless methodology minimizes on-chain price requests but doesn’t eliminate them — when contract interactions are disputed, UMA token holders fulfill price requests via the Data Verification Mechanism, or DVM. UMA tokens enable the holder to participate in community governance and resolve contract disputes through the DVM. The tokens are not an investment opportunity.

Rank #17
$9
-3.05%

Rank #47
$81.6
-3.06%

Rank #120
$0.2125
-1.53%

Rank #198
$17.71
-6.49%

Rank #261
$0.3543
-0.66%

Rank #289
$2,395.72
-2.01%

Rank #302
$0.09828
-3.24%

Rank #422
$0.1963
-2.61%

Rank #628
$0.01906
-7.78%

Rank #788
$0.1395
-0.70%

Rank #1221
$0.6516
+5.41%

Rank #30942
$1,436.14
+6.64%
26 May 2026, 11:05

BitcoinWorld Nine Wallets Hold Decisive Power Over Polymarket Dispute Outcomes, Report Finds A concentrated group of just nine wallets controls the majority of voting power in the UMA oracle system, which settles disputes on the prediction market Polymarket, according to a Bloomberg report. This small cluster effectively holds the final say on the outcome of high-stakes bets, raising serious questions about fairness and decentralization on one of the industry’s most prominent platforms. How a Handful of Wallets Steers the System The UMA oracle system is designed to resolve disagreements over market outcomes by relying on a decentralized vote among token holders. However, an analysis of more than 6,400 addresses that have participated in votes over the past three years reveals a stark concentration of power. Just nine wallets account for half of the total voting power, and these same wallets have been on the winning side of nearly every dispute they participated in. In April 2026 alone, approximately 230 contracts with a combined trading volume exceeding $1 billion were sent to dispute resolution. In every single case, the outcome was determined by this small minority. The system’s design incentivizes voters to align with the expected majority rather than with objective factual truth, creating a structural vulnerability that can be exploited. The Conflict of Interest at the Core The most troubling implication of this concentration is the potential for a direct conflict of interest. Large-scale investors, or ‘whales,’ can place significant bets on a particular market outcome while simultaneously wielding the voting power to steer the final judgment in their favor. This creates a scenario where the entity resolving the dispute may also be the one with the most to gain from a particular result. Risk Labs, the organization that operates both Polymarket and UMA, had previously committed to reforming the governance process to address these concerns. According to the Bloomberg report, those plans are now on indefinite hold, leaving the platform’s dispute resolution mechanism in its current, highly centralized state. Why This Matters for Users and the Market For everyday users of Polymarket, this concentration of power undermines the fundamental promise of decentralized, trustless betting. If a small group can effectively determine the outcome of disputes, the platform’s integrity is compromised. This could lead to a loss of user confidence, reduced participation, and potential regulatory scrutiny. The situation also highlights a broader challenge in the DeFi space: the tension between the ideal of decentralization and the practical reality of concentrated token ownership. Conclusion The Bloomberg report serves as a critical case study in the governance risks inherent in many decentralized systems. While Polymarket and UMA have grown rapidly, the concentration of dispute resolution power in just nine wallets represents a fundamental flaw that the platform’s operators have yet to address. Until meaningful governance reforms are implemented, the platform remains vulnerable to manipulation by a small, powerful minority, a fact that users and regulators alike are likely to scrutinize closely. FAQs Q1: What is the UMA oracle system and why does it matter for Polymarket? The UMA oracle is a decentralized voting mechanism used to settle disputes on Polymarket when users disagree on the outcome of a bet. Token holders vote on the correct outcome, and the majority vote determines the final result. Its importance lies in its role as the final arbiter of truth on the platform. Q2: How can a small group of whales influence dispute outcomes? Because the UMA system is based on token-weighted voting, wallets holding large amounts of UMA tokens have proportionally more influence. The report found that just nine wallets control half of the total voting power, allowing them to consistently determine the outcome of disputes, especially when they coordinate or vote as a bloc. Q3: What are the potential consequences for Polymarket users? If whales can manipulate dispute outcomes to favor their own bets, ordinary users may face unfair losses. This erodes trust in the platform, potentially leading to lower trading volumes, user attrition, and increased attention from regulators concerned about market integrity and consumer protection. This post Nine Wallets Hold Decisive Power Over Polymarket Dispute Outcomes, Report Finds first appeared on BitcoinWorld .
26 May 2026, 08:45

Hyperliquid has shifted its approach to prediction markets, offering native oracles and resolutions. HIP-4 also switched to using USDC as its main liquidity source. Hyperliquid announced it will support canonical outcome markets based on off-chain events, as outlined on its Telegram channel. As Cryptopolitan reported earlier, HIP-4 took 0.7% of the prediction market on its first day of trading. As of May 2026, HIP-4 achieved 1% of the volumes of Polymarket, based on still limited outcome pairs. Existing Hyperliquid validators will run specialized software that automates newsfeeds as event outcomes. The newsfeed will become a part of the regular Hyperliquid chain operations. Unlike on Polymarket, the platform will not depend on third-party oracles or outcome voting systems. Polymarket’s reliance on UMA oracles and voting has led to several heavily contested markets and discussions of market manipulation. Validators themselves will vote on the deployment and settlement of the new type of canonical markets. The current network supporters will resolve the potentially subjective and ambiguous markets. The outcomes will depend on 24 existing validators, which produce Hyperliquid L1 blocks in under a second, and secure $3B in liquidity. Canonical markets do not guarantee objectivity, but protect from exposure to external voting systems. Validators will still vote on outcomes , and are one possible vector of subjectivity. However, smaller resolution systems have shown a risk of whale influence, allowing the manipulation of some markets. HIP-4 offers real-world outcome markets Initially, HIP-4 started with outcomes for crypto price movements, converging perpetual futures with prediction markets. Recently, the platform offered macro outcomes, with predictions on Fed interest rates or inflation levels. The platform’s goal is to automate the workflows, adding AI agents as proposers of new markets. Validators will then have the task of approving those markets and tracking the outcomes. Prediction markets launched on May 2, and are still in their early stages, with a limited number of outcomes. For now, Hyperliquid is still in control on new market launches. In the future, HIP-4 will follow the model of HIP-3, allowing third-party validators to create outcome pairs. To date, the platform has carried 1M trades , and hosts around 500 traders. HIP-4 is already on the map of prediction market platforms, and is now preparing for third-party prediction pair deployment. | Source: Dune Analytics . HIP-4 will depend on builders, and some of the top HIP-3 deployers may create new markets. With this approach, the prediction market may converge with perpetual futures. The positioning of all markets in a single ecosystem may allow cross-margin trading and a concentration of liquidity. Builders will create a competitive environment, trying to launch the most in-demand and liquid prediction pairs. HIP-4 will also allow a novel approach to on-chain insurance, with transparent payouts in the case of predetermined outcomes. The markets can also serve as binary options, using the simplified binary outcome infrastructure. Hyperliquid recovers value locked Hyperliquid is one of the main ecosystems to resist the weakening sentiment of the crypto market. The platform now carries $5.53B in total value locked, down from $5.93M in October 2025. Up to 40% of the newly active volumes come from HIP-3, onboarding flexible trading for traditional assets. Outcome markets may further boost volumes and fees. As a result of the increased activity, the native HYPE token set a series of new price records. HYPE traded at $59.58, after peaking at $63.70, becoming one of the top growth tokens. The recent HYPE rally got a boost from whales, but was also an indicator of the positive view of Hyperliquid and its growth expectations. If you're reading this, you’re already ahead. Stay there with our newsletter .
22 May 2026, 22:25

Polymarket came under attack earlier on Friday after a contract exploit drained more than $600,000 in crypto. Despite the size of the theft, multiple security analysts emphasized that user funds and market outcomes were not impacted. One expert even argued that the incident could have been significantly worse if additional controls in the compromised contract had been used. The Polymarket Attack According to on-chain sleuth ZacXBT’s findings on the matter, he flagged a suspected exploit involving Polymarket’s UMA CTF Adapter contract on Polygon (POL). At the time of reporting, the total figure associated with the exploit had climbed to nearly $700,000. The breakdown of how the exploit functioned was later detailed by security expert Ox Abdul. In his explanation , the first key point was that the USDC amount—over $600,000—appeared to be a one-time drain taken from a specific wallet on Polygon, identified as 0x8F98, the UMA CTF Adapter Admin. Ox Abdul also described how Polymarket’s automation appears to have contributed to the exploit mechanics. He said Polymarket’s top-up system was repeatedly sending 5,000 POL about every 30 seconds to keep an oracle gas wallet funded. Rather than stealing once, the attacker waited for each refill and then swept it for roughly 120 cycles over the course of about 70 minutes, which he estimated as around 600,000 POL . Importantly, the continued POL losses, in this account, were attributed to how quickly Polymarket’s detection and response happened. The exploit was ultimately stopped after the keys were rotated. How The Exploit Could Have Been Worse After draining the refills, Ox Abdul said the exploiter then exited via 16 sub-addresses using ChangeNOW. Even with the damage limited, he warned that the situation had potential red flags beyond the theft itself. In his view, the compromised admin wallet was not only holding USDC and POL; it also carried “resolveManually rights” on the UMA Adapter. Those manual resolution permissions , he explained, could bypass the oracle and allow an attacker to force any market outcome on Polymarket. Ox Abdul laid out what “worse” could have looked like in practical terms. He said the attacker could have taken large positions in specific markets, then flagged those markets for manual resolution, waited out the roughly one-hour safety window, and finally used resolveManually to resolve markets in favor of their positions. Following the incident, Josh Stevens, a leading developer at Polymarket, later provided additional context via social media. Stevens attributed the issue to a compromised 6-year-old private key, explaining that it was included in an internal top-up configuration—so funds were being sent to the key while it remained active. He added that the key has been rotated, all production permissions have been revoked, and the company is moving all private keys to KMS-managed keys going forward. Federal Investigation Launched While the technical incident was unfolding, Polymarket was also dealing with regulatory scrutiny on Friday. As Bitcoinist reported , Rep. James Comer, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, announced a formal investigation into prediction market platforms Polymarket and Kalshi. Comer said the committee is seeking information from the CEOs of both companies regarding their efforts to prevent insider trading on their platforms. In his letter, he requested documents and details on how both platforms implement identity verification for domestic and international account holders, enforces geographic restrictions, and detect anomalous trading activity to help prevent insider trading across their global platforms. In a separate development, Bloomberg reported that Polymarket has appointed a representative in Japan while preparing to lobby for authorization of prediction markets in the country. According to sources cited in the report, Polymarket’s goal is to obtain government approval in Japan by 2030. Featured image created with OpenArt, chart from TradingView.com
22 May 2026, 11:08

A Polymarket security incident drained more than $520,000 in collateral from the platform’s UMA CTF Adapter contract on Polygon on May 22, 2026. On-chain investigator ZachXBT flagged the incident in a community alert and pointed to a compromised deployer address as the likely entry point for the attack. The drain played out across a short window around 09:00 UTC. No official notice from Polymarket or UMA had been posted at the time of reporting. How the Polymarket drain played out? The hack targeted the Polymarket UMA CTF Adapter Admin Contract at address 0x91430C…E5c5, which is an upgradeable proxy that manages the main adapter that holds the market collateral. The blockchain reveals the initial events recorded on the Admin Contract at around 09:00:30 UTC. That should raise an alarm about a proxy pattern exploit. The initial events were quickly followed by transfer events for Polygon’s native currency, POL. At 09:00:49, the adapter admin received 5,000 POL from a Polymarket address. Five seconds later, it sent close to 9,994 POL out to the attacker-controlled account. The pattern repeated at 09:01:19 with another 5,000 POL inflow, followed by a transfer of close to 5,000 POL to the same attacker address at 09:01:26. The two-step transfer moved more than 10,000 POL out of the adapter in under a minute. The drained addresses listed by ZachXBT, 0x871D7c0f and 0xf61e39C7, had sent collateral into the adapter that the attacker then withdrew through the admin contract. The primary attacker address received the POL transfers and began consolidating the funds shortly afterward. A compromised key, not a smart contract bug In this way, the chain of initializing calls to the admin contract shows the risk of key theft and initialization vulnerability rather than any issue with the UMA optimistic oracle logic. The contract was based on the UMA oracle, but the breach occurred in the access control level, and the hacker received the ability to perform admin-only calls. It can be assumed that either the deployment process happened with the help of a key compromised by attackers or an uninitialized contract proxy was available for exploitation. After receiving administrator powers, the hacker could withdraw the whole collateral balance without any need for custom exploits. The Polymarket hack resembles similar events reported earlier in 2026. For instance, the Step Finance hack of about $27.3 million happened due to a breach of the executive key and the multi-sig mechanism at the beginning of 2026. A similar case is the Drift Protocol hack of about $285 million; it happened in April 2026 as a result of a socially engineered admin key, which enabled whitelisting worthless collateral. There were no software vulnerabilities in those smart contracts. Attacker wallet activity and tracing The address 0x8F98075d should be flagged as highly suspicious because it was the destination for both POL collateral transfers and is the greatest opportunity for movement of stolen value out of or into the Polygon network. Similarly, the intermediary address involved in initializing calls 0x65070BE9 can be assumed to be controlled by attackers and deserves similar monitoring. Based on past experiences, there is a possibility that the next step will involve cross-chain bridges and mixing. In the case of Drift , the stolen funds were partially bridged to Ethereum via the cross-chain protocol belonging to Circle prior to laundering. There were no reports as of reporting of large outgoing bridges from the suspect addresses. If you're reading this, you’re already ahead. Stay there with our newsletter .